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Introduction
Financial crises in the emerging markets can often be linked to problems with managing sovereign debt.2 
Debt events, or episodes of debt default or restructuring, can impose severe fiscal and economic costs to the 
affected country. In the immediate aftermath of such crises, poverty and inequality typically increase substan-
tially and impart deep and long lasting negative effects amongst the poorer segment of the population in the 
affected country (Birdsall, 2006; Lustig, 2000; Ocampo, 2005).3 Not only are costs imposed on the country 
directly concerned, but also often on international investors (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2005), and at 
times, on other emerging market economies that suffer from the effects of crisis contagion (Eichengreen, 
2004). Achieving financial stability and enhancing the ability to manage debt at sustainable levels—be it by 
reducing current debt levels and improving debt structure or by developing the capacity to sustain debt levels 
similar to that of industrial countries (that is, to enhance debt tolerance), or more likely by a combination 
of both—are among the principal tasks faced by emerging market economies. For those emerging market 
economies saddled with high public debt and a history of financial instability, including serial default, these 
challenges become especially acute.
Many emerging market economies have taken important steps to lessen their vulnerabilities to crisis. 
These would include increased exchange rate flexibility, improved maturity structures of their debt, and 
foreign exchange hoarding—with some countries such as China reaching reserve levels that surpass most 
economists’ conception of what would be prudently required for self-insurance (Summers, 2006). Notwith-
standing these largely unilateral efforts, it is unlikely that these would be sufficient, for several reasons.
First, self-insurance through reserve-hoarding potentially implies a high social cost for the country, 
and possibly growing fiscal costs for its government (Mendoza, R.U., 2004; Rodrik, 2006). The cost of this 
strategy in terms of postponed consumption is particularly large for an emerging market economy, since by 
their nature, these countries should be anticipating instead of delaying consumption (Caballero, Calderón 
and Céspedes, 2006). Second, besides self-insurance, there are more efficient forms of managing and sharing 
risks. As noted by Andres Velasco, Chile’s Minister of Finance, it is difficult to imagine a world without basic 
1  Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Yilmaz Akyüz, Kathrin Berensmann, Pedro Conceição, Paola Deles, Barry 
Herman and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Their good advice notwithstanding, I 
alone am responsible for any remaining errors in this paper. The views expressed herein are mine and do not necessarily 
reflect those of UNDP.
2  Examining a sample of 20 industrial countries and emerging market economies, during the period 1970-2001, 
encompassing 96 crisis episodes, Kaminsky (2006) finds that crises stemming primarily from sovereign debt problems 
are the most numerous kind among the emerging market economies in her sample; and it is the second most costly 
(after crises due primarily to financial excesses, but where debt problems often also play a role). 
3  The possibility of implementing countercyclical policies typically depends, in large measure, on the macroeconomic 
milieu and institutional stage of development of the country. Many emerging market economies usually find 
themselves unable to use the countercyclical policies that would mitigate the negative effect of a crisis on the economy 
and especially on the poor. Underdeveloped financial markets and lack of access to borrowing by the poor amplify 
these negative effects (see for instance Caballero, Calderón and Céspedes, 2006; Derviş and Birdsall, 2006; Gavin and 
Perotti, 1997; Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2004; Ocampo, 2005 and United Nations, 2006, ch. 4).2  DESA Working Paper No. 48
insurance products (e.g. home, fire, and unemployment insurance) which are now ubiquitous at the house-
hold or individual levels, yet are largely missing at the country level. Absent such macroeconomic insurance 
and risk-management instruments, many macroeconomic outcomes are much worse than they need have 
been. Velasco conjectures that if more insurance mechanisms such as GDP-indexed bonds were available to 
developing countries, then perhaps finance ministers may not need to be too conservative in their policies.4
In addition, “a number of high-debt emerging-market economies face structural, long-term debt 
problems that tend to keep their growth rates low, that impart an unequalizing bias to the growth process, 
that severely constrain social spending and human development, and that make them vulnerable to capi-
tal flow reversals (Derviş and Birdsall, 2006: 329).” There is evidence that these countries have fallen into 
a vicious cycle of serial default. Left to their own devices, these countries often face the impossible choice 
between draconian fiscal austerity or outright default. Through instruments such as a recently proposed sta-
bility and social investment facility (SIF) or a debt tolerance facility, a third, and perhaps more effective path 
to debt management, growth and development could be devised.
It is important to take stock of the literature on the factors that lead to financial crises, including 
debt defaults, as well as the possible innovations by way of new policy instruments that could help countries 
respond to those challenges. This paper contributes to this stock-taking by presenting a compendium of 
policy instruments and proposals to enhance financial stability and debt management in emerging market 
economies. In addition, this paper will attempt to make a contribution on two other fronts. First, drawing 
on the available theory and empirical evidence, it will try to map out some of the key factors that contribute 
to international financial instability. Second, it will use this to develop a possible taxonomy for the array of 
proposed (and some already existing) policy instruments designed to enhance financial stability and debt 
management in emerging market economies. The purpose of this taxonomy is to relate each instrument to 
the particular aspect(s) of the broader policy challenge, thus clarifying differences and/or similarities across 
these instruments and proposals.
The analysis suggests that there are two broad aspects to the policy challenge. The first has to do with 
pursuing domestic institutional and structural reforms as well as sound macroeconomic policies (including 
minimizing currency mismatch risk) and prudential financial regulations that would make emerging market 
economies less vulnerable to financial instability and crisis. Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that 
these types of reforms are important preconditions for preventing debt crises and reducing debt intolerance 
in emerging market economies. A second aspect of the policy challenge has to do with breaking free from the 
vicious cycle of chronic financial instability, including serial default. The analysis suggests that instruments 
that could help increase the efficiency of risk management strategies and the effectiveness of debt manage-
ment, growth and development policies need to be considered further.
Recent Trends in Emerging Market Economies’ Public Debt
Macroeconomic fundamentals in many emerging market economies have undergone a sea change since the 
Asian financial crisis broke out in 1997. Some of its main aspects include more stable prices, more flexible 
4  These comments were made during a seminar on GDP-indexed bonds jointly organized by the Intergovernmental 
Group of 24 for Monetary and Financial Affairs (G-24), the United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (UN-DESA) and the Office of Development Studies of the UNDP. For a full report of the meeting see 
United Nations (2006). The live broadcast of this meeting is available at: http://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.
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exchange rate regimes,5 more robust fiscal performance, strong export performance (in many cases born on 
the back of robust commodity exports), and aggressive foreign exchange reserve accumulation (see among 
others IMF, 2006a and World Bank, 2006a,b). These improved fundamentals have contributed to more 
favourable risk premium spreads for the emerging market economies’ debt. Credit ratings for many emerging 
market economies have also improved. The confluence of lower sovereign risk premiums, low global interest 
rates6 and rabid investor appetite for risk7 have created ideal conditions for a number of emerging market 
economies to conduct policies that are enhancing the structure of their public debt by minimizing some 
forms of risk, rather than using these favourable conditions to borrow more, as might have been the case in 
the past under similar circumstances. The principal focus has been to address three key risks:
Exchange rate risk. Because of differences in the currencies of assets and liabilities (i.e. currency mismatch), 
an exchange rate shock could trigger a sharp rise in the local currency value of foreign currency debt, creating 
debt servicing stress and possibly resulting in a debt crisis. Reducing the share of foreign currency denomi-
nated debt in the total debt structure could help address this risk.
Interest rate risk. Interest payments of a country could rise due to higher interest rates on future debt or on 
the re-pricing of variable rate debt. Countries are thus addressing this duration mismatch by increasing the 
average term to maturity and enlarging the share of fixed rate debt.
Rollover risk. New funding could evaporate or access to international capital could come at a dramatically 
higher cost, notably when a country is hit by a crisis of confidence. Increasing maturities and smoothing 
repayments schedules (such as by prefunding forthcoming debt obligations using the current low rates) could 
help mitigate this risk.
Emerging market economies have turned to various strategies in their debt management operations 
in order to deal with these 3 main types of risks by: (a) decreasing their reliance on foreign currency debt and 
(b) increasing their reliance on local currency debt in order to minimize exchange rate risk; (c) improving 
the maturity on domestic and international issuances in order to minimize rollover risk, and to some extent, 
also interest rate risk; and (d) widening their investor base and lowering total debt (to the extent possible for 
some countries) in order to help mitigate all three types of risk.8
However, while a number of emerging market economies have managed to make successful in-
roads into lowering their vulnerability to financial instability, there are still vulnerabilities that persist. First, 
progress across countries has not been uniform: some countries have been left behind, while others have 
even regressed. For instance, between 1996 and 2004, the share of foreign currency debt in total public debt 
increased in the Russian Federation (42 percentage points), Chile (28 percentage points), and the Philippines 
(28 percentage points) (IMF, 2006a: 94). These indicators need to be taken in their country-specific context 
however. Countries that have increased their foreign currency denominated debt shares are not necessarily 
5  Since 1996, the IMF (2006: 110) reports that 20 emerging market economies have adopted flexible exchange rate 
regimes or increased flexibility of the nominally flexible regime. 
6  Real long term interest rates in G-7 countries reached their lowest levels in 2004 since the mid-1980s, with rates 
increasing only slightly in 2005 (World Bank, 2006b: 12).
7  Examining the period from 1983 to 2005, Gai and Vause (2006: 179) note that “More recently, investors’ appetite for 
risk has been strong, above the sample average and at levels comparable to those of 1996 when Alan Greenspan spoke 
of irrational exuberance.”
8  It is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on these trends. For a comprehensive summary, see the original full 
draft from which this paper is based: Mendoza, R.U. (2006).4  DESA Working Paper No. 48
more vulnerable in absolute terms, since some countries have also lowered their over-all public debt. For 
example, the Russian Federation has reduced the level of its public debt quite dramatically—from about 70 
per cent of GDP in 1998 to about 10 per cent of GDP in 2006 (see Table 1). Hence, the net impact of these 
two trends would need to be considered.
There has also been uneven progress in trying to avoid a potential mismatch of foreign currency 
liabilities with local currency assets across emerging market economies. Using as an indicator of vulnerabil-
ity to currency mismatch the Aggregate Effective Currency Mismatch (ACEM) index (with more negative 
values indicating higher vulnerability to currency mismatch), in a sample of nine Asian emerging market 
economies, Singapore and Hong Kong—the two financial centres in the sample—are shown to be the least 
vulnerable to currency mismatch problems (see Figures 1a-1b).9 In terms of reducing currency mismatch 
risk during the period since the Asian crisis, there has been some progress in Indonesia, Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia and Thailand, but evidence of deterioration in the Philippines.
Furthermore, for a number of countries, rather than eliminate risks altogether, the shift in the 
balance of foreign currency and local currency denominated debts merely transformed the nature of these 
risks. A review of the structure of public debt issued in the domestic jurisdiction for several emerging market 
economies (for which this kind of data is available) reveals that countries like Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, 
(among the countries that have decreased their foreign currency denominated debt and shifted emphasis to 
local currency denominated debt) have ended-up with high shares of variable rate local currency denominat-
ed debt (see Jeanne and Guscina, 2006: 23). Therefore, some countries’ exchange rate risk has merely been 
transformed into maturity risk and/or interest rate risk (Eichengreen, 2007; World Bank, 2005: 82).
There is also still a number of emerging market economies that continue to be hobbled by high 
over-all levels of public debt. In a sample of 28 emerging market economies using data from J.P. Morgan 
Securities (see Table 1), ten countries breached the 50 per cent threshold for total public debt (expressed as a 
share of GDP) in 2006: Philippines (74 per cent), India (73 per cent), Uruguay (71 per cent), Hungary (67 
per cent), Turkey (67 per cent), Argentina (62 per cent), Panama (61 per cent), Brazil (58 per cent), Pakistan 
(56 per cent), and Colombia (52 per cent).10 Of these countries, the largest increases in public debt (scaled 
by GDP) when compared to the 1998 Figures are in Uruguay, Argentina, Turkey, Colombia and Brazil (in 
this order).11 One might also question to what extent some emerging market economies, Brazil and Turkey 
among them, could continue to run high primary fiscal balances, given their development financing needs. 
In these two countries, for example, a large share of annual income goes into servicing sovereign debt: on 
average during the period 1998-2006, about 30 per cent of GDP for Brazil, and 40 per cent of GDP for 
Turkey.12
9  Developed by Goldstein and Turner (2004), the AECM index provides one possible measure of a country’s financial 
vulnerability to currency mismatches in terms of income and expenditure flow. The ACEM considers both the currency 
of foreign borrowings, and also the currency of domestic debt contracts and other income and expenditure flows. It is 
computed as the product of foreign currency debt (as a share of total debt) and the country’s net foreign currency assets 
or NFCA (scaled by exports of goods and services if NFCA is negative or scaled by imports of goods and services if the 
NFCA is positive). Figures closer to zero indicate a better currency match; and more negative values indicate higher 
vulnerability to a currency mismatch.
10  Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003: 31) develop an early warning system for debt crises and find that 
developing countries with debt to GDP ratios greater than 50 per cent are the most likely to default, with default risk 
of about 67 per cent. 
11  Author’s calculations based on data from Table 1.
12  Data downloaded last 8 June 2007 from J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. https://mm.jpmorgan.comA Compendium of Policy Instruments ...           5
Figure 1.  
AECM Index for Select Asian Economies, 1997 and 2005
1a. ACEM Index for 1997               1b. ACEM Index for 2005
Many of these heavily indebted emerging market economies also have a history of financial instabil-
ity, including debt defaults. Of the ten countries breaching the debt threshold of 50 per cent in 2006 (in 
Table 1), 7 experienced a credit event, defined as a default or restructuring on its external debt13 in the last 
30 years.14 Focusing on a sample of 26 countries, Figure 2 juxtaposes their 2006 debt levels with their history 
of debt defaults.15 For some of these countries, their problems could be chronic—they have default histories 
and their present debt levels could again render them vulnerable to a debt crisis.
One has to wonder whether, in the next global tightening of credit or after the next major domestic 
political or external shock, these countries would still be able to find solid fiscal footing. A sudden reversal of 
the benign global credit environment could create a negative fiscal impact on emerging market economies by 
increasing the cost of servicing their variable rate debt and by increasing the interest rate cost on new debt. 
Using simulations, Hauner and Kumar (2005: 17-18) find that a 300 basis points hike in industrial country 
base interest rates would create fiscal costs of about 1.5 percent of GDP for heavily indebted emerging mar-
ket economies—and these costs would rise as cheaper debt is replaced by new (and more expensive) debt.16
To summarize, a number of emerging market economies have taken steps toward greater financial 
stability and debt tolerance, buoyed in part by presently favourable global conditions. Yet, the evidence also 
suggests that some countries remain vulnerable. What happens when presently favourable global conditions 
turn? Can the pace of reforms be sustained? Will domestic reforms be sufficient to stave of crisis?
13  The source of this definition is Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003).
14  The seven countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Turkey and Uruguay. Utilizing a battery of 
thirty financial crisis vulnerability indicators in their analysis, Goldstein and Wong (2005: 45) also note that Argentina, 
Brazil and Turkey (with the addition of Hungary and Mexico) appear to be the most vulnerable among the emerging 
market economies at the time of their study in 2005.
15  The 26 countries in Figure 2 are: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russian 
Federation, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
16  For an extended discussion of the possible risks faced by emerging market economies, notably those with high debt to 
income ratios, see Goldstein and Wong (2005), IMF (2005), Mussa (2006) and World Bank (2006b). The IMF has 
also begun to include comprehensive reviews of countries’ debt dynamics in its Article IV reviews; these could therefore 
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It is unlikely that present, largely unilateral, reforms are sufficient. For one, many countries remain 
vulnerable to crisis, as noted in this section. In addition, as noted earlier, a number of reforms related to self-
insurance—such as hoarding reserves and excessive austerity—are not only detrimental to economic growth 
and development, but also sub-optimal from a risk management and risk sharing perspective. Furthermore, 
for countries that might remain trapped in a vicious cycle of serial default, the options for unilateral action 
are limited, unlikely to be effective and clearly very costly. The discussions on these issues have generated a 
wealth of ideas to create innovative instruments that could perhaps form part of a more efficient and effective 
strategy to achieve financial stability and enhance public debt management.
Mapping the Factors that Contribute to Financial Instability
There are by now an array of existing and proposed instruments that seek to enhance financial stability and 
debt management capabilities in emerging market economies. The annex to this paper lists these instru-
ments, including some recent proposals such as growth- or GDP-indexed sovereign bonds, a stability and 
Table 1.  
Total Public Debt (In per cent of GDP)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007*
Argentina 37.6 43.0 45.1 53.6 153.4 138.1 119.1 71.0 62.0 53.6
Brazil 42.5 55.7 54.6 64.2 60.4 70.9 64.8 65.0 57.7 61.0
Chile 34.2 35.6 36.0 36.5 36.2 33.4 28.6 24.3 15.8 14.3
Colombia 37.8 42.4 53.0 57.5 65.1 62.9 56.2 55.1 52.1 49.2
Costa Rica 47.2 46.5 44.7 45.5 45.7 44.0 42.4 40.0 35.1 33.6
Dom. Rep. 25.7 23.7 25.7 23.5 25.8 55.9 63.9 42.7 41.8 37.4
Ecuador 67.4 100.6 88.9 66.7 56.9 50.7 44.6 39.8 34.2 32.3
El Salvador 33.3 34.6 36.5 39.8 44.5 47.2 46.0 45.4 44.4 43.5
Mexico 31.0 30.3 26.6 26.3 25.6 26.5 26.0 24.6 25.0 26.5
Panama 64.5 67.2 66.5 71.1 69.4 67.3 69.9 65.3 61.1 57.3
Peru 42.8 47.1 45.3 46.1 46.4 47.0 44.3 37.7 32.7 29.7
Uruguay 27.0 40.6 45.5 54.2 92.1 108.3 100.9 83.8 71.0 64.9
Venezuela 30.4 29.1 27.4 30.1 36.8 48.0 39.0 33.7 25.5 20.3
South Africa 48.9 46.9 42.0 41.2 35.6 35.3 35.1 33.5 31.3 28.4
Bulgaria 86.4 83.3 78.2 69.0 60.3 52.4 39.2 27.3 25.1 19.8
Hungary 61.8 60.5 53.4 50.7 55.6 58.0 59.4 61.7 66.8 68.9
Poland 40.5 39.9 37.7 37.7 42.3 47.2 45.8 47.3 48.1 48.5
Russia 69.9 93.2 62.5 48.0 41.4 32.9 24.0 13.9 9.5 8.3
Turkey 44.8 51.8 58.8 106.7 96.3 97.2 86.7 73.3 67.3 63.4
Ukraine 34.4 48.3 45.3 37.1 33.5 29.0 24.7 18.9 16.1 15.0
China 13.2 16.1 17.2 18.0 19.5 19.9 17.1 15.4 13.6 12.5
India 61.0 62.4 63.5 67.1 73.3 74.5 72.2 68.1 73.3 68.8
Indonesia 119.3 94.6 99.2 68.9 60.8 54.6 49.5 42.1 33.1 29.6
Korea 11.0 19.4 17.2 19.4 12.7 14.0 19.9 23.4 27.1 27.5
Malaysia 37.6 37.3 36.7 43.6 45.6 47.8 48.1 47.3 47.5 41.6
Pakistan — — 95.0 109.9 81.4 75.3 67.8 61.8 56.1 52.9
Philippines 67.6 72.0 80.1 78.8 84.6 92.8 95.5 83.0 74.3 65.6
Thailand 43.3 49.4 36.5 40.9 46.1 42.6 39.8 38.5 32.1 26.9
Source: Data downloaded 8 June 2007 from J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. https://mm.jpmorgan.com
* Figures for 2007 forecasted.A Compendium of Policy Instruments ...           7
Figure 2.  
Debt Ratios and Credit Events for 26 Emerging Market Economies
Sources: Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003: 16) for the data on credit events from 1970-2001; J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. for the 
debt ratio in 2006 (https://mm.jpmorgan.com).
social investment facility (SIF) and a debt tolerance facility. In order to better understand these instru-
ments, as well as determine how they figure into what we now know about financial crises prevention and 
debt management, it would be useful as a first step to map, if only in a preliminary and illustrative way, the 
factors that contribute to financial instability and debt management difficulties. Drawing on the literature, 
this section develops such a map, in turn used to elaborate on a possible taxonomy of instruments. This 
taxonomy could then help to highlight the precise function of each instrument as well as the value-added of 
some recent proposals.
One could draw on the discussion in the preceding section in order to outline some of the broad 
contributing factors behind debt management difficulties. Figure 3 illustrates what such a map of financial 
instability factors might look like and how these factors, in turn, influence a country’s debt dynamics. The 
“story” behind Figure 3 is not the only possible narrative that is consistent with the literature, and merely 
represents one possible synthesis of some of the theory and evidence presently available.
First, domestic institutions and structural features of the economy17 and the international financial 
architecture18 have been identified in the literature as the broad categories of factors that influence a country’s 
vulnerability to financial instability.19 Notably, these factors could affect the country’s capacity—and in some 
17  See for instance Burger and Warnock (2006), Goldstein and Turner (2004) and Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano 
(2003).
18  See for instance Hausmann and Panizza (2003) and Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2005a,b).
19  Catão and Kapur (2006), for example, extend the empirical analysis in Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) by 
using the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates as a proxy for the institutional and structural roots that could help 
explain debt intolerance. Examining 26 emerging market economies during the period spanning 1970-2001, they 
find that a 1 percentage point increase in the underlying volatility of GDP is associated with a 12 percentage point 
decline in the maximum debt threshold that a country could sustain Catão and Kapur (2006: 22). Their findings 
further suggest that strategies to reduce debt may be suboptimal if these preclude feasible consumption smoothing and 
if these fail to address the sources of domestic income volatility. In addition, countries with better institutions (using 
various measures) tend to display better economic performance (e.g. higher levels and lower volatility of growth) (IMF 











































d8  DESA Working Paper No. 48
instances willing-
ness—to repay its debt 
(links 1 and 2 in the 
Figure). To elaborate, 
on the domestic front, 
poor institutions (e.g. 
political, regulatory 
and supervisory) and 
economic features 
that leave the country 
vulnerable to external 
shocks (e.g. heavy reli-
ance on one or a few 
commodity exports, 
high ratio of short-
term domestic debt) 
and on the interna-
tional front, the inability to improve the country’s debt profile by issuing local currency debt abroad and 
shedding significant currency mismatch risk are just some of the factors that could lead to problems in its 
capacity and/or willingness to repay its debt. The latter, in turn, could lead to episodes of financial instability 
and/or debt distress (link 3).20 Thus, any country with poor fundamentals and institutions, and economic 
structures that are vulnerable to shocks could thus face the prospect of financial crisis (link 4).
Before proceeding, it would be important to note several things at that point in the figure. First, 
financial instability need not develop into full-blown crisis episodes. Based on a number of possible explana-
tions for financial instability and crises explained earlier, some types of crises could be stemmed, or at least 
mitigated. The literature on second generation crisis models as well as on “sudden stops” of capital flows 
lends some support to this view.21 Second, not all bouts of financial instability would necessarily lead to debt 
distress, nor for that matter, to a debt event (i.e. defined in the literature and in the introduction to this pa-
per as “episodes of debt default or restructuring”). However, history suggests that financial instability could 
eventually (and quite often does) create the conditions for a debt event; and given the focus of this paper on 
public debt, the figure continues with a specific focus on this dimension.
For a number of emerging market economies, the underlying problems described by links 1 through 
4 could subsequently lead to a history of financial crisis and serial default (link 5). There is no strict defini-
tion of how many crises would constitute a history of “serial default”.22 Suffice it to say that a default in the 
past (amplified if the number of defaults is higher) increases the likelihood that the country could enter 
into a form of “debt trap” through adverse feedback effects. One possible route for these feedback effects is 
20  Drawing a parallel with the distressed debt literature in corporate finance, Sy (2003) defines sovereign bond distress 
events as occurring when bond spreads are trading 1000 basis points or more above comparable US Treasury securities. 
He argues that in practice, the 1,000 bps mark for spreads is often considered as a psychological barrier by market 
participants. The use of the term “debt distress” in this paper is not meant to be as specific as this definition. The 
purpose is to highlight episodes of instability that are not quite at crisis levels.
21  For a more detailed review of the literature on three generations of speculative attack models, see Frankel and Wei 
(2005: 318-323). For a discussion of “sudden stops”, see among others, Calvo (1998, 2002, 2005), Catão (2007), 
Edwards (2004), Mendoza, E. (2006), and Mendoza, E. and Smith (2006).
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that a default history could translate into higher perceived default risk and higher risk premiums, and could 
subsequently shrink capital inflows (link 6). Perhaps more importantly, high risk perceptions could also tend 
to make these flows more volatile. Combined, the literature suggests higher financial and macroeconomic 
volatility is anathema to growth (link 7).23 In addition, financial crises resulting in default could also do 
permanent damage to the growth path of a country as theory and evidence suggests (link 8). Finally, poor 
growth also tends to set back reform efforts to make domestic economic and institutional structures more 
robust and conducive to weathering shocks (link 9).24 This completes the adverse feedback effect and spurs 
the vicious cycle.
This type of a “debt trap” story is prevalent in the debt literature. For instance, Eichengreen and 
Hausmann (2005: 6-7) note that “institutional reform…is critically important. But it may not be suffi-
cient if the structure of international finance heightens volatility in a way that handicaps efforts at institu-
tion building, effectively creating a low-level equilibrium trap.” In addition, the difference in the ability to 
carry more debt between the advanced economies and heavily indebted emerging market economies (i.e. 
the reason behind debt intolerance in the latter group of countries) is thought to lie in the combination of 
shorter maturities, much lower fiscal revenue-to-GDP ratios, more volatile revenue, higher real interest rates 
and exchange rate risk, and a history of lower primary surpluses, which suggest that many emerging-market 
economies essentially find themselves in a debt trap. “Many have debt-to-GDP ratios that are not really sus-
tainable, making them vulnerable to repeated crises of confidence” (Derviş and Birdsall, 2006: 330).
A strand of the monetary literature also suggests that, under circumstances of high public debt, 
tighter monetary policy could lead to higher inflation if fiscal policy does not change. The reason is that ex-
pectations will factor in that government obligations will need to be covered by seigniorage revenue (Sargent 
and Wallace, 1981). As for empirical evidence, Kwon, McFarlane and Robinson (2006: 21) examined 71 
industrial and developing countries during the period 1963-2004 and concluded that “there is a significant 
risk of a debt-inflation trap in highly indebted countries. A rise in inflation expectations will eventually push 
up nominal interest rates, elevating public debt unless fully countered by a primary surplus. The debt in-
crease will in turn raise inflation expectations further. This vicious feedback effect implies that rising inflation 
expectations could increase budgetary costs more than proportionally. This also means that rising inflation 
expectations could be destabilizing to the debt dynamics more than an adverse real output shock—possibly 
by as much as one third to one half.”
In addition, Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) note that when default imposes high costs on 
a country’s banking and financial system, this cost is a strong deterrent against default. These authors argue 
that weak financial intermediation among countries that are serial defaulters thus tend to lower the penalty 
for default, which might induce these countries to default at lower thresholds, as their empirical analysis also 
shows. Serial default thus weakens the financial system further, and perpetuates the cycle.25
23  There is an extensive literature on this particular topic. See for example Ffrench-Davis (2006), Hnatkovska and Loayza 
(2005) and seminal work on this topic by Ramey and Ramey (1995).
24  This is a point raised by Eichengreen, Hausman and Panizza (2005a,b).
25  In addition, incentives play an important role not only in determining the level of public debt, but also the debt 
structure. Tirole (2002), for example, argues that from a common-agency perspective, a government and a lender 
may tilt the loan maturity structure toward the short term without internalizing its effects on the potential reduction 
of other investors’ long term claims due to the increased probability that the country would face liquidity constraints 
in the future. In addition, Alfaro and Kaczuk (2006) argue that under certain conditions, shorter-maturity debt may 
prove more sustainable because longer-maturity debt structures could be associated with equilibria in which defaults 
happen more frequently and at lower welfare costs.10  DESA Working Paper No. 48
In summary, this “map” (Figure 3) is meant to be a preliminary illustration, and enables a broad char-
acterization of the possible areas for policy action. It also helps to distinguish two broad aspects of the policy 
challenge at hand. The first has to do with links 1 through 4 which pertain to efforts to achieve financial sta-
bility in emerging market economies by pursuing reforms, including institutional and structural ones, which 
would make an emerging market economy more robust against financial instability, and would, over time, 
enhance its debt tolerance. A second aspect focuses on links 5 through 9, and it is especially important for 
countries that might find themselves under “debt trap” conditions that tend to lock them into perennially low 
levels of institutional quality and high vulnerability to crisis episodes, reinforcing unfavourable debt dynamics.
Not all countries have high public debt coupled with a history of default, suggesting that for most 
countries, the challenge could be circumscribed to the first aspect (i.e. achieving financial stability). However, 
as noted earlier, there a number of emerging market economies whose public debt exceeds what is normally 
regarded as sustainable given current conditions, and because of their histories of default in addition to that, 
the literature suggests that they suffer from a form of chronic vulnerability. Hence, for these countries, the 
entire figure, including the first and second aspects described earlier, is relevant.
Developing a Taxonomy of Instruments
Based on a survey of existing and proposed instruments to increase financial stability and enhance debt 
tolerance in emerging market economies, thirty-five instruments are listed in Table 2 with brief descriptions 
provided in the annex to this paper. Table 2 illustrates the beginnings of one possible taxonomy, constructed 
according to the key purpose of the instrument. It might be possible to develop other taxonomies which 
might serve to distinguish these instruments. For example, one could differentiate them according to market- 
versus non-market related types. Clearly, there are other aspects of the instruments discussed here that may 
not be fully reflected by this proposed taxonomy. However, it is nevertheless a practical way to differenti-
ate the instruments, by drawing directly on how each instrument might help to break the cycle of financial 
instability and serial default illustrated earlier in Figure 3.
While the categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as some instruments could serve several 
purposes, six main categories of instruments are identified, namely, instruments that provide for (or help 
facilitate): (a) emergency liquidity provision; (b) countercyclical financing; (c) currency mismatch reduction; 
(d) orderly debt restructuring; e) debt reduction; and f) social investment and growth financing. Each of 
these, in turn, could be linked to the map described in the previous section, as will be elaborated in each of 
the following points.
Emergency liquidity provision. The literature suggests that the provision of emergency liquidity to emerging 
market economies with essentially good fundamentals but suffering from a credit crunch could help stem the 
occurrence of self-fulfilling financial crises as well as help prevent contagion. One could think of this as ad-
dressing the challenges reflected in part by link 4. Essentially, a key objective is to prevent financial instability 
and/or debt distress from deteriorating into a financial crisis. Emergency liquidity is often a key ingredient to 
achieve this.
Instruments proposed here include those designed to provide access to liquidity during crisis or 
pre-crisis situations. One example is a revamped contingent credit line (CCL) which would be provided to 
countries with sound policies in order to help prevent crisis contagion, perhaps coming in the form of a gen-A Compendium of Policy Instruments ...           11




































































































































































1  Collective action clause 
2  Commodity risk insurance 
3  Compensatory financing facility 
4  Contingent credit line 
5  Contingent liquidity facility 
6  Countercyclical guarantee facility 
7  Country insurance facility 
8  Currency swap 
9  Debt exchange warrant 
10  Debt swap (or conversion) 
11  Debt tolerance facility 
12  Digital option 
13  Domestic currency inflation-indexed bond (EM Index) 
14  Emerging market local currency debt (LCD) portfolio 
15  Emerging market fund (EMF) 
16  Exogenous shock contingency facility 
17  Fiscal insurance mechanism 
18  Fiscal rule 
19  Growth- or GDP-indexed bond (GIB) 
20  Indexed bond 
21  Macro security 
22  Partial credit guarantee 
23  Partial risk guarantee 
24  Policy based guarantee 
25  Political risk guarantee 
26  Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Rest. 
27  Regulatory risk guarantee 
28  Reserves 
29  Reserve augmentation line (RAL) 
30  Reserves securitization 
31  Shock absorber facility (SAF) 
32  Sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) 
33  Sovereign guarantee pool 
34  Stability and social investment facility (SIF) 
35  Variable amortization bond 
Sources: See the annex of this paper for further details on these instruments.12  DESA Working Paper No. 48
eral tightening of credit to emerging market economies as a group. Since the original CCL expired (unused) 
in 2003, there has been a proposal for a modified instrument, the reserve augmentation line (RAL), which 
would be made available to countries with strong policies, but with remaining vulnerabilities, and without 
immediate need for crisis-related financing. Other examples of instruments providing emergency liquidity 
include proposed insurance-type instruments such as a country insurance facility (CIF) which would provide 
a country access to a line of credit at a prefixed rate and a shock absorber facility (SAF) that would provide 
a form of insurance against exogenous shocks mainly by helping to smooth their effects on a country’s fiscal 
balance and debt ratio.26 Bilateral or a regional system of currency swap arrangements could also provide 
emergency liquidity by allowing countries with sound fundamentals to swap specified amounts of foreign 
exchange reserves during periods of high demand (such as immediately before or during a financial crisis).
In the same vein, the compensatory financing facility (CFF) at the IMF was established in the 1960s 
to assist countries experiencing a sudden shortfall in export earnings or an increase in the cost of cereal 
imports caused by commodity price movements. In addition, the injection of liquidity could be focused very 
specifically on a particular area, such as to stabilize asset prices and prevent potentially destabilizing balance 
sheet deterioration, as envisioned by a proposal for an emerging market fund (EMF). While these instru-
ments operate differently, they all share a similar basic function which is to provide liquidity to economies 
that essentially have good policies at precisely the period wherein the lack of liquidity (such as during a sud-
den stop episode) threatens financial stability.27
Countercyclical financing. Not necessarily tied to the immediate threat of financial crisis, instruments that 
provide for more general countercyclical finance could help to counteract the effects of the ebb and flow of 
international capital.28 Providing for countercyclical finance is particularly important in emerging market 
economies because their fiscal policies are often found to be more procyclical compared to industrial coun-
tries (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Kaminsky, Reihnart and Vegh, 2004; Talvi and Vegh, 2005). One way to in-
terpret the general function of instruments falling under this category would be to see them as responding to 
link 3 on Figure 3—these instruments could help mitigate the effects of boom and bust cycles and perhaps 
also help minimize the potential for financial instability and debt distress. Examples of these instruments in-
clude those focused on ensuring more stable infrastructure finance such as a countercyclical guarantee facility 
provided by a multilateral development bank or export credit agency to developing countries;29 or instru-
ments designed to smooth cyclical fluctuations in fiscal expenditures such as a fiscal insurance mechanism 
which would be comprised of a system of intra-country compensating payments, perhaps within a regional 
setting. Essentially, it would also be possible to envision using a country’s reserves as a means to undertake 
countercyclical financing, if policymakers decide to draw down on the country’s reserves for this purpose.30
26  Birdsall, Williamson and Deese (2002) supported the creation of a similar facility called an exogenous shock 
contingency facility. Intended to benefit heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), this facility would grant additional 
debt relief if shocks that are clearly exogenous to the country result in a new erosion of debt sustainability. 
27  A contingent liquidity facility serves a very similar purpose but is targeted at specific projects, such as to finance 
infrastructure. It is envisioned to assist project companies in structured financing arrangements that have borrowed 
in foreign currency to continue to meet their foreign exchange payment obligations; the loan is contingent, and given 
only in the event of a major devaluation in the host country currency.
28  For further discussion on countercyclical policies, see Ocampo (2003; 2002).
29  For a comprehensive review of various risk mitigation instruments for infrastructure finance, see in particular 
Matsukawa and Habeck (2007).
30  For some instruments, there is a fine line distinguishing between the function of emergency liquidity provision and 
the function of countercyclical financing. It could perhaps be argued that instruments designed to supplement reserves 
could also be used to help undertake countercyclical financing, notably when made available in a pre-crisis context (e.g. 
contingent credit line (CCL), reserve augmentation line (RAL), currency swap arrangements). A Compendium of Policy Instruments ...           13
Some market based instruments have also been proposed in part with the purpose of enhancing a 
country’s ability to implement countercyclical policy. For instance, commodity risk insurance instruments 
could be used by farmers and government agencies to help temper the effects of volatile commodity prices.31 
In addition, growth- or GDP-indexed bonds belong to a broader category of indexed bonds whose pay-
ments could be linked to the underlying conditions of the issuer, notably those that impact on its capacity 
to pay. These types of bonds could also help alleviate the effects of the ups and downs of the economic cycle, 
by minimizing the burden of debt payments at precisely those times when the country may be more hard-
pressed to repay its debt.32 GDP-linked bonds enable investors to take an equity-like exposure in the coun-
try, with the buyer sharing in the fortunes of the issuer, and with the issuer not bound by fixed obligations.
Alternative instruments carry the equity dimension even further. As envisioned, macro securities 
would be traded in a market for long-term claims on aggregates of income such as a country’s GDP, and 
could thus be designed to enable a country to raise finance in a way that firms do by issuing equity. In a 
similar vein, digital options could be designed to provide a pay-off that is correlated to potential sudden stop 
episodes, thus allowing for liquidity at precisely the time the country most needs it.
These abovementioned instruments are particularly interesting because they have better risk sharing 
properties when compared to self-insurance strategies, which includes the hoarding of reserves, or the use of 
buffer stocks. In this way, they are superior to self-insurance because they allow for a packaging and trading 
of macroeconomic and other risks, and enhances countries’ and various agents’ risk management strategies 
(Shiller, 2003; 2006).
Currency mismatch reduction. Currency mismatch could contribute to the financial fragility of the econo-
my, and could perhaps be reflected in part by link 2 in Figure 3. As noted earlier, currency mismatch is not 
just due to the inability to borrow abroad in one’s own currency; it depends on a wider set of policies. Cer-
tainly, lowering the reliance on foreign currency denominated debt by retiring them or swapping them for 
local currency denominated debt (through, for example, debt exchange warrants) and holding higher reserves 
could help lower currency mismatch risk.33 However, this leaves the question of whether this imposes high 
costs—or higher costs than would otherwise have been under alternative strategies.34 As noted in the litera-
ture, high reserve holding (often combined with sterilization) has the effect of preventing the absorption 
of some of the external financial resources flowing into a country. Switching to local currency debt markets 
could, among other things, have the effect of crowding out domestic private lending. Therefore there are the 
additional questions of whether and to what extent these strategies might actually erode the net benefits to 
be derived from external finance.
31  The United Nations World Food Programme has recently turned to this instrument. In 2006 it took out a drought 
insurance policy for Ethiopia in order to ensure that if aid is required in the event of a drought, the WFP would have 
the requisite financing immediately to provide relief assistance. See Financial Times (2006). 
32  Variable amortization bonds, a slightly modified version of a GDP-indexed bond, alter only the timing of the payments 
but otherwise leave the total amount of payments unaltered.
33  A related proposal involves securitizing reserves in order to help lower the costs of reserve-holding. See the annex of this 
paper for a brief description of the proposal. 
34  There is evidence to suggest that reserve holding is indeed a very costly self-insurance strategy. For instance, Rodrik 
(2006: 9) estimates that the cost of excess reserves in developing countries is about 1 per cent of their combined GDP. 
While this may not be a high cost for a country that is better protected against a devastating financial crisis, it may be 
high when compared to alternatives that might be able to provide the same type of protection, like reducing short-term 
debt. However, countries seem to be reluctant to undertake this alternative strategy, according to Rodrik, because it 
could be perceived as an intervention that goes against a fully liberalized capital account.14  DESA Working Paper No. 48
To some degree, the provision of emergency liquidity and countercyclical finance also implies miti-
gating currency mismatch risk, since these instruments typically involve the provision of liquidity in “hard 
currency” (e.g. US dollars). However, the focus here is on a number of proposed instruments that could 
specifically help emerging market economies minimize currency mismatch risk by enabling them to issue 
local currency denominated debt that would be held more widely by foreign investors (hence not necessarily 
crowding out the private sector in the domestic debt market). Two proposals are worth noting in this regard. 
One envisions multilateral development banks (MDBs) jump-starting the market for local currency bonds 
in the international capital markets by creating bonds denominated in an inflation-indexed basket of emerg-
ing market economies’ currencies. A very similar alternative proposal envisions a larger private sector role—
instead of relying on MDBs, private sector actors could construct diversified portfolios of emerging market 
local currency government debt securities that would provide investors with competitive returns. In either 
case, the idea is to help enhance the ability of emerging market economies to shed their currency mismatch 
risk by increasing the foreign holdings of their local currency denominated debt.
Orderly debt restructuring. In the event of a debt default, a principal challenge in crisis management is 
the orderly restructuring of sovereign debt. The literature notes two types of instruments to respond to this 
challenge: those allowing for a contractual approach such as collective action clauses (CACs); and those 
characterized by a more statutory approach, such as proposals for more formal debt restructuring procedures, 
including a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM). This topic has been the principal focus of 
numerous other studies on this particular dimension, so no further elaboration is made here on instruments 
falling under this category.35
The SDRM proposal died a natural death in 2003,36 but there has been recent progress in establish-
ing voluntary market-based guidelines for cooperative action in which borrowers and creditors alike rec-
ognize their mutual interest in pursuing dialogue and cooperative actions. The Principles for Stable Capital 
Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring highlights key actions for crisis avoidance, focuses on crisis containment 
and management in ways that can be applied flexibly and on a case-by-case basis, and seeks to ensure good 
faith negotiations and fair treatment in situations when debt restructuring is necessary (IIF, 2005). In a way, 
these principles help preclude and lessen the necessity for debt restructuring, to the extent that government 
efforts to avoid crisis would help ensure stable capital flows. However, this instrument is located here, under 
debt restructuring, essentially because of its other main purpose of helping ensure a fair debt restructuring 
process should one become unavoidable.
Debt reduction. As noted earlier, a number of emerging market economies have public debt levels that 
surpass what is typically regarded as a safe debt threshold by emerging market economy standards (i.e. 50 per 
cent debt-to-GDP ratio). Because institutional reforms to enhance these countries’ debt tolerance may take 
time, for some countries, there might be no other recourse but to lower their public debt to levels that would 
help mitigate the threat of financial crisis. On Figure 3, one could think of this aspect as related to link 
4—that is, by lowering the debt level, the probability of a financial crisis might be lowered as well.
There are several instruments of interest here. Fiscal rules, for example, could bind the country to 
maintain budget deficits and public debt ratios below certain thresholds, thus preventing public debt from 
increasing. In addition, debt swaps or conversions could enable the cancellation of debt in exchange for the 
35  The interested reader may wish to refer to Eichengreen (2006) for a discussion of CACs and the SDRM as alternative 
instruments to deal with sovereign default challenges.
36  The proposal failed to gain requisite support at the IMF. See http://www.imf.org/external/np/cm/2003/041203.htm.A Compendium of Policy Instruments ...           15
debtor’s commitment to mobilize resources for an agreed purpose, such as environmental preservation or, as 
envisioned by a more recent proposal, MDG-related investments or projects.
Other proposals envision the creation of official lending facilities. The proposal for a stability and 
social investment facility (SIF), for example, envisions the creation of a multilateral lending facility that 
would grant access to loans with blended concessionality in order to help heavily indebted emerging mar-
ket economies with otherwise sound fundamentals and a demonstrated commitment to running primary 
surpluses to reduce their debt and vulnerability to debt-related problems and set a path for the growth of real 
income.37 A very similar proposal for a debt tolerance facility envisions the international financial institutions 
(IFIs) sponsoring the creation of a facility in which high-reserve countries (e.g. China, India and Republic of 
Korea) will invest a fraction of their reserve holdings; and the facility would then on-lend to heavily indebted 
emerging market economies at a spread that is lower than that of market rates but higher than the return on 
present reserves (e.g. the US treasury rate to the extent that this where reserves are invested). Thus the pro-
posal for a debt tolerance facility is envisioned to be a win-win for both groups of high reserve and heavily 
indebted emerging market economies. These two latter proposals are particularly interesting not only because 
of their intended purpose of reducing debt to more sustainable levels, but also to the extent that they could 
help address the related challenges of serial default and debt intolerance, discussed next.
Social investment and growth financing. Heavily indebted emerging market economies, notably those with 
a history of serial default, could find themselves in a form of “debt trap”. As mentioned earlier, this is il-
lustrated, in part, by Figure 3—links 6 through 9 indicate how financial crises could lead to a feedback effect 
on a country’s underlying economic fundamentals and institutions, which would then lead to further vulner-
ability to crises. A principal challenge then would be to try and break from this vicious cycle, and bring the 
country back to more favourable debt dynamics, and on track for more robust growth.
Part of the immediate task for some emerging market economies would be to reduce their debt, as 
noted earlier. However, shedding debt intolerance requires much more than debt reduction. It would require 
the types of institutional and structural reforms that would solve the underlying causes of their chronic 
vulnerability (Catão and Kapur, 2006; Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003). In addition, it would also 
require time—time to develop a track record of credibility and time to implement policies and pursue insti-
tutional reforms that would enable the country to handle higher amounts of debt.
To some extent, guarantee instruments (e.g. partial credit, partial risk, political risk and regulatory 
risk guarantees) could help ensure that promising investments, notably in infrastructure, would receive ad-
equate financing despite low credit ratings for a country. Furthermore, policy based guarantees could be pro-
vided to emerging market economies in support of efforts to undertake reforms that may not immediately 
translate into lower risk ratings. Special arrangements might also be feasible for countries jointly undertaking 
projects that might benefit one or more countries. The proposal for a sovereign guarantee pool, for example, 
could facilitate currency (and regulatory) risk sharing among countries with common interests and projects. 
This risk pooling arrangement could create benefits for groups of countries with different credit ratings, and 
enable projects to be financed based on the risk ratings of the most credit worthy participating country.
Beyond sovereign guarantee instruments, the proposals for a stability and social investment facility 
and debt tolerance facility could also potentially be very useful, because they could more directly assist coun-
37  The SIF would be different from other IMF facilities such as the extended fund facility (EFF). While the former is 
envisioned to provide blended concessionality lending, the latter type of facility provides non-concessional lending.16  DESA Working Paper No. 48
tries in the process to shed their debt intolerance. As envisioned, these lending facilities could support the 
transition from bad to good debt dynamics by lowering the cost of capital for emerging market economies 
that have already demonstrated strong political commitment to reduce public indebtedness and pursue fiscal 
and institutional reforms.
Another key purpose of these types of facilities would be to help ensure that the fiscal and insti-
tutional reforms would not come at the cost of lower investments, notably those in human capital. This is 
achieved, principally, by offering a blend of concessionality,38 which in turn is expected to help spur more 
favourable debt dynamics over the period of access to the facility. Hence, these types of facilities are entirely 
different from what has been on offer by international financial institutions so far. Table 3 highlights the 
38  Perhaps more concessional than IDA loans, but less so when compared to non-concessional IBRD loans.
 
Table 3. Summary of the Key Features of the SIF, CCL and CIF 
 
  Stability and Social 
Investment Facility  
(SIF)





The instrument  Lending facility involving 
an IMF-World Bank 
program to:  
a) reduce the chronic 
vulnerability of high-debt 
middle-income countries; 
and  
b) set a path for the 
growth of real income. 
Lending facility serving as 
a precautionary line of 
defence against contagion. 
Interest rate insurance that 
guarantees automatic access 
to a line of credit at a 
prefixed rate. 
Conditionality  Phased-in so that given 
initial conditions, the 
likelihood of 
disqualification would be 
low; qualification requires 
Executive Board approval  
Ex ante, involving a 
qualification process that 
requires IMF Executive 
Board approval 
Ex ante 
Eligible countries  Heavily indebted emerging 
market economies with 
sound policies but are 
vulnerable to contagion 
Countries with sound 
policies, who were not at 
risk of an external 
payments crisis of their 
own making, but were 
vulnerable to contagion  
Same as CCL  
Financing Phased-in to minimize 
moral hazard 
Upon qualification, 
automatic only for the first 
tranche 
Up front and automatic 
Concessionality  Blending between 
concessional funds and 
regular lending facilities; 
cost would be close to 
LIBOR 
Surcharge over the IMF's 
normal market-based loan 
rate would have begun at 
150 basis points, rising to 
350 basis points, depending 
on the duration of the 
drawing. 
Surcharge equal to 300 bps, 
and applying 
a 50 bps increase if 
extended for another six 
months. 
Sources: Cordella and Yeyati (2005), Derviú and Ozer (2005), Derviú and Birdsall (2006) and IMF (2004). 
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potential value-added of the stability and social investment facility (SIF), compared to emergency liquid-
ity type instruments like the contingent credit line (CCL) and the country insurance facility (CIF). What 
is clear from the intended design of the SIF—including phased-in conditionality, targeted access, phased-in 
financing and blended concessionality—is that it is not a crisis facility; and it is envisioned to respond to the 
source of the chronic problem for many high debt emerging market economies. A facility like the SIF could 
thus further enhance the prospects for graduating out of debt intolerance by improving a country’s prospects 
for debt management, growth and development.
Conclusion
Drawing on the available theory and evidence, this paper sought to map out the factors that contribute to 
financial instability and debt management difficulties in emerging market economies. It developed a possible 
taxonomy for the array of proposed (and some already existing) instruments designed to enhance financial 
stability and debt management in emerging market economies. While the taxonomy described in this paper 
is only a preliminary attempt at categorizing these various instruments and proposals, it does help to high-
light which instruments respond to which specific aspects of the broader policy challenge at hand. This clari-
fies the specific purpose and potential contribution of each instrument.
This paper shows that the policy challenge faced by emerging market economies has two important 
aspects. The first has to do with achieving financial stability, with an emphasis on pursuing domestic institu-
tional and structural reforms, as well as putting in place sound macroeconomic policies (including minimiz-
ing currency mismatch risk) and prudential financial regulations. Both theory and empirical evidence suggest 
that these types of reforms are important preconditions for preventing debt crises and enhancing debt 
tolerance in emerging market economies. However, there is also reason to believe that country reforms might 
not be enough. In particular, some of the steps countries have unilaterally taken—such as, in some cases, 
increased reserve hoarding or implementing severe austerity measures—amount to very costly self-insurance 
strategies. There are better ways to manage macroeconomic and other types of risks, and instruments such 
as growth- or GDP-indexed bonds and macro securities could potentially offer countries more efficient risk 
management strategies. There is a strong case for enhanced international cooperation, both at the regional 
and multilateral levels, to explore and facilitate the broader use of these types of instruments (Ocampo, 
2006; Conceição and Kaul, 2006).
In addition, a second aspect of the policy challenge applies to high debt emerging market economies 
characterized by chronic debt intolerance: to break free from the vicious cycle of serial default. For countries 
that are already in this debt trap, it is unlikely that their unilateral measures alone will be adequate to the 
task. The analysis in this paper reveals that instruments designed to help address this second aspect demand 
special attention, notably as there is evidence suggesting that debt-related problems in a number of emerg-
ing market economies have become chronic. This provides strong impetus to consider and develop propos-
als such as for a stability and social investment facility (SIF) or a debt tolerance facility, in order to offer 
countries a more effective path towards enhanced debt management and stronger growth and development 
outcomes.18  DESA Working Paper No. 48
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Annex: Instruments to Enhance Financial Stability and Debt Tolerance
Collective action clause (CAC). A contractual provision in international sovereign bonds that allows for a 
committee of bondholders to negotiate with the debtor in the name of all bondholders (IMF 2002; Eichen-
green 2006).
Commodity risk insurance. Refers to insurance and insurance-type instruments such as commodity futures, 
options and weather index derivatives. These tools are designed to help mitigate the risk of commodity price 
and/or income volatility (Hess, Richter and Stoppa 2002).
Compensatory financing facility (CFF). A non-concessional lending facility in the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) established in the 1960s to assist countries experiencing either a sudden shortfall in export earn-
ings or an increase in the cost of cereal imports caused by fluctuating world commodity prices (IMF 2004a).
Contingent credit line (CCL). A non-concessional lending facility at the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) established in 1999, but never used, aimed to help members prevent financial crises. It is designed for 
countries implementing sound economic policies, which may find themselves threatened by financial conta-
gion. In November of 2003, the CCL was allowed to expire on its scheduled sunset date (IMF, 2004b).
Contingent liquidity facility. A facility for providing a loan to assist project companies in structured 
financing arrangements that have borrowed in foreign currency to continue to meet their foreign exchange 
payment obligations; the loan is contingent, and given only in the event of a major devaluation in the host 
country currency. A domestic currency liquidity facility could help projects meet shortfalls in their local cur-
rency revenue stream that may result because of political problems with raising tariffs or prices following a 
major devaluation (Griffith-Jones and De Lima, 2006).
Countercyclical guarantee facility. Guarantee facility with an explicit countercyclical feature. For example, 
by taking a longer term perspective in their risk evaluations when issuing guarantees for lending to develop-
ing countries, multilateral development banks and export credit agencies could help mitigate boom-bust 
cycles (Griffith-Jones and De Lima, 2006).
Country insurance facility (CIF). Proposal for “an interest rate insurance that guarantees automatic access 
to a line of credit at a prefixed rate, if the borrowing country complies ex ante with a number of verifiable 
conditions. Whenever a liquidity run pushes borrowing costs above the CIF interest rate, an eligible country 
may turn to the insurer as an alternative financing source, avoiding the need to validate temporarily high in-
terest rates that may have permanent negative effects on debt sustainability (Cordella and Yeyati, 2005: 17).”
Currency swap. System of bilateral and regional arrangements to swap specified amounts of foreign reserves 
in the event of increased demand during a financial crisis. An example is the Chiang Mai Initiative, which is 
composed of an expanded Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) swap arrangement (ASA) and 
a network of bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) among ASEAN countries, the People’s Republic of China 
and the Republic of Korea (ADB, 2003). There is also a proposal to expand and multilateralize the present 
system of bilateral swap arrangements by creating a central reserve fund where the reserves could be merged 
and complemented by a more robust regional economic monitoring arrangement (ADB, 2003).
Debt exchange warrant. An option that allows the holder to swap foreign currency denominated debt for lo-
cal currency denominated debt under specific conditions. In November 2005, Mexico inaugurated the use of A Compendium of Policy Instruments ...           23
this tool by selling warrants that would allow investors to swap up to $2.5 billion of US dollar denominated 
debt (with varying maturities between 2007 and 2033) for peso denominated debt (with maturities in 2011, 
2014 and 2024) in late 2006. If exercised, the warrants would have the effect of increasing the average dura-
tion of domestic debt as well as decreasing the foreign exchange exposure of Mexico (IMF, 2006a, box 3.3).
Debt swap (or conversion). The cancellation of debt in exchange for the debtor’s commitment to mobi-
lize resources for an agreed purpose. In international lending for example, the World Conservation Union 
(IUCN) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) have been involved in debt for environment swaps in several 
countries. A recent proposal involves a wider use of this tool by offering to creditors a menu of MDG-related 
investments or projects (De Venecia, 2005; UNDP, 2003).
Debt tolerance facility. A facility that would be sponsored by the IFIs in order to encourage high reserve 
countries/economies (e.g. China, Taiwan ROC, Republic of Korea, etc.) to invest some portion of their 
reserves into a facility that would then on-lend to heavily indebted emerging market economies to help 
these countries reduce their debt levels under an IFI program. The cost of this lending could be set much 
lower than market rates (the latter determined for each qualifying country); but higher than the spreads that 
high-reserve countries presently earn on their reserves. It would thus be a “win-win” for both the high reserve 
countries that would be lending; as well as the high-debt countries that would be borrowing. (World Bank, 
2004).
Digital option. Comprised of a combination of put and call options, this instrument is envisioned to de-
liver a payoff that is correlated to sudden stop episodes. An example would be an asset based on the S&P’s 
implied volatility index, which, if added to emerging market economies’ portfolios could enhance their risk 
management strategies and help smooth the impact of sudden stops (Caballero and Panageas, 2005).
Domestic currency inflation-indexed bond (EM Index). Bond denominated in an inflation-indexed basket 
of currencies of emerging and developing countries. As envisioned, an IFI would borrow by offering this 
type of debt security, attracting investors because the security’s value could not be inflated away (because it’s 
indexed), and its value would tend to be stable (because it’s comprised of a basket of currencies). The IFI 
could then on-lend to developing countries on an indexed basis in the currencies that constitute the index, 
and in the proportions that make up the basket, helping to solve the problem of currency mismatch (Eichen-
green and Hausman, 2004; Williamson, 2005).
Emerging market local currency debt (LCD) portfolio. A diversified portfolio of emerging market local 
currency government debt securities that could be constructed and held by investors. “The LCD portfolio 
would work by buying local-currency government debt instruments from many different developing coun-
tries and combining them so as to produce a portfolio whose return and variance would be competitive in 
international capital markets (Dodd and Spiegel, 2005: 94).” Compared to the EM Index proposal, the LCD 
portfolio proposal differs to the extent that it does not necessitate the approval and active participation of 
industrial countries nor the international financial institutions.
Emerging market fund (EMF). A fund from which financing would be drawn in order to help stabilize an 
emerging market bond price or spread index such as J.P. Morgan’s EMBI. The EMF would respond to the 
malfunctioning of the global capital market by acting as a lender of last resort, and aligning incentives with 
public announcements by providing financing, as well as helping to relieve institutional market constraints 
(e.g. collateral constraints) by infusing the market with greater liquidity. The EMF would, in a way, provide a 24  DESA Working Paper No. 48
price guarantee to create an environment in which asset prices can be credibly expected to remain above the 
crash levels that trigger sudden stop episodes (Calvo, 2002; Calvo, 2005).
Exogenous shock contingency facility. A facility that grants additional debt relief if shocks that are clearly 
exogenous to the country result in a new erosion of debt sustainability. This kind of insurance against exog-
enous shocks was first proposed to prevent regress in heavily indebted poor countries’ debt reduction (Bird-
sall, Williamson and Deese, 2002).
Fiscal insurance mechanism. “A system of intra-country compensating payments undertaken to smooth 
cyclical fluctuations in fiscal expenditures. Member countries would agree to contribute to a buffer fund 
administered by a supra-national institution or a centralized fiscal authority. The risk-sharing scheme would 
consist of a set of rules that determine the amounts of net transfers according to permanent and cyclical 
components of government revenues (Dos Reis, 2005: 151-2).”
Fiscal rule. Specific commitment made by a national government (or group of governments) to maintain 
budget deficits and public debt ratios below certain thresholds. One example is the EU Stability and Growth 
Pact (Heller, 2003).
Growth- or GDP-indexed bond (GIB). Bond that “would link payments on sovereign debt to the issu-
ing country’s rate of economic growth…By stabilizing debt ratios they could, in some circumstances, help 
reduce the occurrence of debt defaults and financial crises (Council of Economic Advisers, 2004: 1).” There 
are at least two possible types of these bonds. One would index the amount of payments (on interest and/or 
principle) to the borrowing country’s GDP; another, the variable amortization bond, would index the sched-
ule of payments instead (see Borensztein and Mauro, 2004; Council of Economic Advisers, 2004; United 
Nations, 2005).
Indexed bond. Bond whose terms of payment are linked to real variables related with or impacting on the 
underlying economic conditions of the issuer. Examples include catastrophe bonds, commodity-indexed 
bonds, domestic currency inflation-indexed bonds, and GDP-indexed bonds.
Macro security. A type of security traded in a market for long-term claims on aggregates of income (includ-
ing national incomes). This tool would create new classes of tradable risks, enhancing risk management 
opportunities (Shiller, 2003).
Partial credit guarantee. Guarantee that provides comprehensive coverage against all risks for debt service 
default on a specified portion of the loan or debt. In international lending, partial credit guarantees are typi-
cally offered by multilateral development banks (see http://www.miga.org/sitelevel2/level2.cfm?id=1058).
Partial risk guarantee. Guarantee that covers only certain pre-determined types of risk in a transaction. 
In a project finance structure, it can protect either sponsors (equity investors) or debt investors. Coverage 
could include: changes in law; failure to meet contractual payment obligations; obstruction of an arbitration 
process; expropriation and nationalization; foreign currency availability and convertibility; nonpayment of a 
termination amount or an arbitration award following a covered default; and failure to issue licenses, approv-
als, and consents in a timely manner. In international lending, partial risk guarantees are typically provided 
by multilateral development banks. A partial risk guarantee could also be applied as a targeted regulatory risk 
guarantee (Sheppard, 2005).A Compendium of Policy Instruments ...           25
Policy based guarantee. Guarantee provided to support certain types of policy reforms by a country, notably 
those in its financial sector. In international lending, policy based guarantees are typically offered by multilat-
eral development banks. For instance, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
offers a policy based guarantee that is designed to support access to international financial markets for its 
well-performing member countries, when the markets are temporarily con  strained or blocked. Like partial 
credit guarantees, policy based guarantees cover a portion of debt service on borrowing (loans or bonds) by 
an eligible member country from private foreign creditors; but policy based guarantees are provided in sup-
port of agreed structural, institutional, and social policies and reform. These guarantees are considered an 
alternative or supplement to adjustment loans (see http://www.worldbank.org/guarantees).
Political risk guarantee. Partial risk guarantee that covers specific events such as currency inconvertibil-
ity and transfer restrictions, confiscation, expropriation, and other forms of deprivation of project assets; 
political violence (sometimes including terrorist attacks); and breach of contract. In international lending, 
political risk guarantees are typically offered by multilateral development banks (see http://www.miga.org/
sitelevel2/level2.cfm?id=1058).
Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring. A set of voluntary market-based guide-
lines for cooperative action in which borrowers and creditors alike recognize their mutual interest in pursu-
ing dialogue and cooperative actions. The Principles (a) highlight key actions for crisis avoidance; (b) focus 
on crisis containment and management in ways that can be applied flexibly and on a case-by-case basis; and 
(c) forthrightly underscore the need for good faith negotiations and fair treatment in situations when debt 
restructuring is necessary. The Principles focus on ensuring four key areas: (a) transparency and timely flow 
of information; (b) close debtor-creditor dialogue and cooperation to avoid restructuring; (c) good faith ac-
tions; and, (d) fair treatment (IIF, 2005).
Regulatory risk guarantee. Partial risk guarantee that covers certain aspects of regulatory risk related to an 
infrastructure project, such as the timing of and formula used for tariff adjustments. In such arrangements, the 
host-country would provide a commitment to maintain certain features of its regulatory regime and in case 
they fail to do so, the project sponsors would then be able to draw on a letter of credit provided by a commer-
cial bank, with a commitment for reimbursement by the World Bank. The latter in turn, would invoke the 
counterguarantee provided by the host country government and seek reimbursement (Sheppard, 2005).
Reserves. Typically refers to a central bank’s holdings of foreign currency assets, particularly foreign govern-
ment securities; however, a country’s reserves could also include gold and special drawing rights (SDRs). 
Reserves are often used similar to a buffer stock—the buying and selling of foreign exchange is used to even 
out fluctuations in the country’s exchange rate. However, reserves could also be drawn-upon in order to 
implement countercyclical policies (Higgins, 2004; Mendoza, R.U., 2004; Rodrik, 2006).
Reserve augmentation line (RAL). A proposed IMF instrument that is intended to reduce the risk of 
capital account crises, reinforce strong policies, and offer an alternative to costly self-insurance strategies. It 
is also expected to potentially fill the void in the IMF’s crisis prevention framework left by the expiration of 
its contingent credit line (CCL) in 2003. As presently envisioned, the proposed features of the RAL include, 
among others, strong qualification criteria (e.g. good macroeconomic policies, sustainable debt, transparent 
data reporting and no immediate need for financing) and frontloaded access. Countries with access to inter-
national capital markets, and with no significant need for policy adjustment and reform, but with remaining 
vulnerabilities are the intended users of this instrument (IMF, 2006b; 2007).26  DESA Working Paper No. 48
Reserves securitization. A proposal to “securitize” reserves, thereby eliminating the fiscal costs of sterilizing 
capital inflows, while at the same time giving domestic investors an opportunity to diversify their portfolio 
holdings. Once the central bank has accumulated the reserves it feels it needs for precautionary purposes, it 
would determine the amount of outflows that it would be willing to permit. It would then license a private 
fund management company to start a closed end foreign asset fund with initial assets totalling that amount. 
The company would raise money from domestic investors by selling them fund shares denominated in the 
domestic currency. The central bank would sell the fund foreign currency, at the prevailing market exchange 
rate, in exchange for the domestic currency the fund raises from investors. The fund would then invest the 
foreign currency in foreign financial assets like stocks and bonds. Periodically (say every quarter), new funds 
could be licensed, or the size of existing ones augmented, based on the desired level of capital exports, which, 
in turn, could depend on factors such as the level of inflows (Prasad and Rajan, 2005: 5-6).
Shock absorber facility (SAF). A proposed lending facility at the IMF with the function of reducing the 
impact of exogenous shocks on developing countries and emerging markets, mainly by smoothing the ef-
fects of exogenous shocks on fiscal balances and debt ratios. The SAF would provide a type of insurance not 
available through traditional borrowing by shifting the risk of specific external shocks from the participat-
ing country to the IMF. The SAF would be structured similar to an IMF loan, except payment terms would 
be steeply linked to a key variable which proxies for the external shock of greatest concern to the country 
(Forbes, 2006).
Sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM). A statutory framework for sovereign debt restructuring, 
proposed at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Essentially, this mechanism would allow a sovereign 
and a qualified majority of creditors to reach an agreement that would then be made binding on all creditors 
that are subject to the restructuring (Eichengreen, 2006; Krueger, 2002).
Sovereign guarantee pool. “Sovereign guarantee pools [would] facilitate currency (and regulatory) risk shar-
ing among countries with common interests and projects. If carefully structured, such a risk pooling arrange-
ment could benefit both participating countries with lower credit ratings than their neighbours and those 
with better credit ratings (Griffith-Jones and De Lima, 2006: 588).”
Stability and social investment facility (SIF). A lending facility with a blend of concessionality to help in-
debted emerging market economies attain sustainable growth and viable public finances while allowing them 
to continue fighting poverty and progressing toward the Millennium Development Goals. It is intended to 
support heavily indebted middle-income emerging market economies to pursue a medium-term program 
with the explicit aim of reducing their chronic vulnerability to debt-related problems and setting a path for 
the growth of real income (Derviş and Ozer, 2005; Derviş and Birdsall, 2006).
Variable amortization bond. Bond that allows the borrower some flexibility in the schedule of payments on 
principle and/or interest, but otherwise maintaining the total amount of payments unaltered. In internation-
al lending, one proposal envisions a GDP-indexed bond that would have variable amortization—allowing 
the borrower to delay payments once its GDP drops below a certain floor. The borrower would then make-
up through possible pre-payments if the GDP pierces a certain ceiling (United Nations, 2005).